INDIAN NUCLEAR CAPABILITY – AN INSTRUMENT FOR ATTAINING A REGIONAL POWER STATUS

During peacetime, armies in accordance with the threat scenario formulate doctrines, organise and equip themselves and train with the sole purpose of fighting and winning wars. Consequently change in the threat scenario dictates a corresponding change in the response (doctrines, equipment, organisation, training methodologies etc). In our regional scenario the recent acquisition of nuclear capability and allied state of art technologies / weaponry by India warrants an in-depth study of the threat to ascertain suitable response options ensuring that our armed forces remain capable of fighting and winning wars in the face of conventional as well as nuclear threat.
INDIAN NUCLEAR CAPABILITY – AN INSTRUMENT FOR ATTAINING A REGIONAL POWER STATUS The conduct of nuclear test by India in 1974 was a historical event in the South Asia. It not only triggered a new arm race in the region but was also an indicator of hegemonic Indian designs. As the events unfolded, it became evident that with the acquisition of this capability, India not only wanted to join the elite nuclear club but was also desirous to be recognised as a world power. Its close alliance with Russia, Israel and recent collaboration with United States of America proved the validity of its designs. This necessitates a critical analysis of the Indian Nuclear Capability vis-à-vis its designs, so as to ascertain that whether this capability is an instrument of attaining a regional power status beyond Pakistan or otherwise?
ABSTRACT OF INDIAN NUCLEAR CAPABILITY – AN INSTRUMENT FOR ATTAINING A REGIONAL POWER STATUS
Pakistan’s security concerns have not been alleviated following the end of the cold war. The absence of any meaningful threat from the western border is a heartening development, but the environments in South Asia have now grown more dangerous with the erosion of the discipline and restraint that super powers competition exercised on regional rivalries. Relations between Pakistan and India have taken a turn for the worse over the Kashmir dispute during the past few years.Pakistan today has every reason to feel apprehensive. The quality and quantity of arms that India has acquired have reached an unprecedented level. The ability of the Indian armed forces to project power far beyond the country’s borders has increased substantially. It has been spending most of its defence budget on acquiring modern weapons. The publicized surface to surface missiles and weapons of mass destruction have captivated the attention of world in recent years. Indian development of long range missiles threatens to unleash a costly and highly destabilising arms race in the region of South Asia. These missiles threaten all countries of Gulf, Central Asia, China and part of South East Asia, evoking defensive responses and eroding stability. The acquisition of the nuclear capability by India has further aggravated the situation. This forced Pakistan to follow India to address her security concerns. The threat that Pakistan perceives from India is not a product of our fevered imagination, but a harsh reality. Various baffling questions arise in the minds of some peaceful strategists and thinkers, like what could be the aim of India in developing such a cost intensive and ambitious nuclear programme when their security could have been ensured with much lesser cost and efforts? Why India is defying all international efforts of non-proliferation of mass destructive weapons? Whether India has developed the nuclear capability as an answer to threats from Pakistan or with some other designs? This paper aims at answering these questions.
In this paperan endeavour has been made to establish a link between the past and the present status of Indian nuclear programme. I then further developed my research to dig out the relation between the Indian designs and the practical steps which confirms the legitimacy of these designs in order to draw some conclusions for further research in this field.
INTRODUCTION
1. For the last many decades, successive Indian governments have been trying to model India’s military potentials and its development on the pattern of the major powers. They have mostly focused of three aspects to include the acquisition of compatible defence collaboration with the countries in possession of modern technology, indigenization of high-tech military equipment and to sustain its ever-growing military requirements through gaining arms export markets. India could not achieve much success in the decades of 70s and 80s due to the close collaboration with USSR. Its military hardware comprised 70 percent of Russian origin, which was of inferior quality as compared to the Western military technology. However, after the breakup of USSR, it stared to explore new spheres of co-operation with Western World. After struggling to establish itself as a military might in the region, it appears that now India has succeeded in putting its military prowess on the track of modernization and started to move in the direction of their ultimate objective to be a significant player in the global politics.
2. India’s entry into the Nuclear Club was announced by the benign words “Bhudda is smiling “on 17 May 1974. The shock waves generated by the 15 Kiloton device at Pokhran soon faded in the sand dunes of Rajistan but the geo-strategic waves continue to echo in the Subcontinent in particular and the world in general. A close analysis of Indian nuclear capability indicates that it was not a coincident but this was a long perceived idea which has been in the minds of Indian leaders for quite some time. To quote one such example we get clear indications of Indian designs from the Prime Minister Nehru in his Presidential address to the Congress centennial celebrations. He said, “We must commit ourselves to the demanding task of making India a mighty power in the world. It is difficult to envisage a mighty power and a powerful India without its possessing the nuclear arsenal.” These words can not be graded as an individual judgment but it is an image of the Indian psyche which is pursued vigorously by each Indian leader. This research is, thus, focused on to unveil and factually prove the hidden Indian designs and ambitions for becoming a regional power using its nuclear capability as one of its instruments.
3. A lot of reference material is available in the form of opinions, articles and analysis available both on internet as well as in a published form, yet at times it became difficult to assess the Indian nuclear capability as no official confirmation or record is available on the issues. However, an extra care has been taken to first, segregate between the authenticated sources and unauthenticated ones and then deduce the required information. Most of the data mentioned in this research paper is verified from multiple sources to reproduce in the present shape.
AIM
4. To analyze of the Indian Nuclear Capability vis-à-vis its designs, so as to ascertain that whether this capability is an instrument of attaining a regional power status beyond Pakistan or otherwise?
OVERVIEW
5. The paper encompasses the following:-
a. Present capability.
b. Futuristic designs.
c. Implications.
d. Conclusion.
CHAPTER I – PRESENT CAPABILITYBACKGROUND
6. Indian nuclear programme can be divided into five time periods / phases[1]. The first phase extends from the year 1944 to 1956. India is first amongst the developing countries to break the monopoly of the great powers. A successful interplay of basic sciences, technology, experience and the industry is the basic pre-requisite for the development of a nuclear programme. India was fortunate to have such scientific potential well before its inception. The University of Calcutta, established in 1876, had a great impact on the scientific development in India. Similarly, the Indian Institute was established in 1909, where Dr. Bhabra did much of his research on introducing atomic energy in India. Hence, even before the partition, there was fairly well developed infrastructure for scientific development in India. In early 1940s, Indian scientists significantly realized the importance of nuclear technology both for peaceful as well as military purposes. The Tata Institute for Fundamental Research was established in 1944, by Homi J. Bhabra. Indian nuclear programme owes much to Dr Bhabra’s ideas before independence and their materialization thereafter. In 1948, India was first among the developing countries to lay the foundations of Indian Atomic Energy Commission under Mr. Bhabra. As a measure to provide infrastructure to the Atomic Energy Commission, Atomic Energy Establishment was formed at Trombay in 1954. It was renamed as Bhabra Atomic Research Centre in 1967. Most of the nuclear industries had their origin in this centre.
7. The Indian leadership was equally concerned with the political implications of the development of such a technology. Fortunately, Mr. Nehru dominated the Indian politics for over two decades, who firmly believed in the modernization of Indian society for the solution of all problems related to the poverty, hunger, disease and illiteracy. He was a firm believer in the role of scientific and technological developments in the prosperity of his country. Thus, this political support solved all financial problems and full government backing was provided to Mr. Bhabra. It helped him to produce competent nuclear scientists and introduction of many laboratories, processing units and power houses. After achieving a solid base India looked for some foreign support and according to Ved Mehta, writing in his Penguin 1978 book, “ The New India “, he narrated :-“ India became a Nuclear Power in parts because of an agreement reached in 1956 between the then Prime Minister of Canada, Louis St. Laurent and then the Prime Minister of India, Jawahal Lal Nehru……Nehru was in the sense the heretic son of Mahatma Gandhi.”
8. The second phase of India’s nuclear programme was between 1956 to 1966.During this period also, much emphasis was laid on the training and building up of scientific research for nuclear technology infrastructure. In 1955/56 first research reactor was constructed. It was followed by commissioning of a larger reactor in 1959/60 named CIRUS in collaboration with Canada. At the same time efforts were made to establish enriched nuclear reactor with the assistance of USA and other two natural Uranium reactors at Rana Partab Sagar from Canadian assistance. First heavy water plant was established at Mangal in 1962 with the help of Germany. Agreements were made with USA for provision of enriched Uranium fuel for Tatapur Reactor in 1963. agreements were also made with other countries like Sweden ( 1961 ) , Denmark ( 1962 ) , Belgium ( 1965 ) in the years to come. Hence this period was most productive in the country’s nuclear programme as its scientists were not only successful in designing and constructing a nuclear reactor but were able to attain an international repute in this field.
9. The third phase i.e. 1966 – 1970 was in continuation of the previous two phases. First setback was the incidental death of Mr. Bhabra, it was then followed by the cutting off the USA’s and Canadian assistance once Indian refused to sign Non Proliferation Treaty in 1968. These setbacks cause a considerable delay in the achievement of the intended objectives .However, despite that continuous efforts were made for the development of nuclear power plants at Tatapur, Rajistan, Madras and Fuel Complex Narora.
10. The heavy water projects and the Fast Breeder Reactor facility at Kalpakkam continued in the forth phase of Indian nuclear programme commencing from 1970 -71. At that time Mr. Sarabhai , the Chairman of Indian Atomic Commission presented a ten year plan for the development of Atomic and Space Research to be implemented between 1970 -80. Salients of the plan include the commissioning of 1200 MW nuclear power plant before 1980, construction of 500 MW thermal reactor, development of Nawrapur Uranium Mines and completion of a Nuclear Fuel Complex. India was lucky to acquire many facilities in the form of foreign aid. However, it suffered a setback once she exploded its first underground nuclear device on May 18, 1974, claiming to be for peaceful purposes only. By virtue of this blast India became first developing country to demonstrate its nuclear capability and sixth nation to join the Nuclear Club besides USA, USSR, China, France and UK. Thereafter, the India never looked back and continued relentlessly pursuing her ambitions by multiplying her capability. On May 11, 1998, India shocked the world with a series of five underground nuclear explosions in a span of two days at Pokran. Since its last explosion, India is still in pursuance of developing her nuclear arsenal to further exploit it as a tool of dominance in the region. [2].
b. CHAPTER II – FUTURISTIC DESIGNSPOLITICAL DESIGNSEvolution of Political Aspirations
13. Introduction. After attaining independence on August 15 , 1947 , Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, speaking to the Constitutional assembly said, “ India has a tryst with the history “; thereby visualising a big power role of India in future. When the British withdrew from the subcontinent, India regarded itself as the inheritor of the British and influence in the region[5]. It is worth mentioning that at the time of independence, India chose Asoka Chakra as its emblem and gave it a central place in its national flag. The Asokan Empire not only consisted entire Indian subcontinent but extended well beyond the present day South Asia. The important era in the evolution of the Indian political designs are highlighted in the succeeding paragraphs.
14. Nehru’s Era. Pundit Jawaharlal Nehru ruled India as its first Prime Minister for 17 years and was the main architect of the Indian foreign policy. Thus, he was the main articulator of India aims, aspirations and ideas. He wanted to restore the self-esteem of Hindus which had suffered from a thousand years of the Muslim conquest and rule of India. Nehru held the first Asian conference in Delhi in 1948.At this conference he talked about India being “ Pivot of Asia “ and wanted to see it become the “ Light of Asia “. In the cold war era, he disfavoured a tilt towards any big power and followed a non-aligned policy. He further used the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) as an international base to project India’s power and influence. This policy enabled India to lean towards the west after its war with China 1n 1962. It resulted in acquisition of substantial aid at this critical venture. Indian foreign policy under Nehru by and large remained successful with an exception of a few blind spots i.e. Pakistan, Kashmir and China. The relationship with Pakistan was initially based on the annoyance that a sizeable part of Mother India had become a separate and sovereign entity. Having resisted the creation of Pakistan, Nehru and his colleagues tried to smother it by withholding desperately needed share of assets like sterling balances, military stores and basic necessities like canal water etc. The Kashmir problem itself was rooted in hostility towards Pakistan. The desire to gain Kashmir was as strong as to deny it to Pakistan. India’s stand on Kashmir was so untenable that it became a blot on the India’s moral conscience thereby disfiguring its image at international level. Indo-China relations have also been a stigma on Indian foreign policy. Indians initially professed brotherly relations with China. It was fathered away with the Indian perennial ambitions to play a role of big power in Asia and thus culminated in a humiliating defeat in the Sino-Indian war of 1962.
15. Post Nehru Stance. After the death of Nehru, his daughter Indra Gandhi guided the foreign policy of India in the following years. She did not conceal the Indian aspirations of becoming a great power and thus began to build up its armed forces to the forth largest in the world. She did not hesitate to explode the India’s first atomic bomb in 1974 to project the Indian might. She believed in twisting arms of her neighbours with the use of power when necessary. During her tenure India’s relations with her all neighbours came under tremendous pressure. After annexing Sikkam in 1975, she frightened landlocked Nepal and Bhutan by tightening hold on the trade and transit facilities. Bangladesh too, unveiled the ugly face of India after being assisted to gain independence. The question of the use of Ganges water was a constant strain in their relations apart from the failure to hand over the promised Tin Bigah Corridor to Dhaka. India played a significant role in the destabilisation of Sri Lanka by permitting Tamil Tigers to establish their training camps in the South India. She realised Pakistan to be the main obstacle in the Indian path to supremacy. She took full advantage of the internal turmoil in Pakistan in 1971 resulting in its dismemberment into two parts. As a further step she initiated an aggression in the Siachen Glacier in 1984 to begin a series of confrontation in that region.
16. Present Era. The following governments continue to adopt the notions of hegemony and coercion as a central place in their policy. The pursuance of the same policy by the prominent leaders of BJP along with other hawkish elements ruling India led to the May 1998 nuclear explosions and the subsequent announcement of its draft nuclear doctrine. Some of the glaring aspects that form basis of the Indian current policy including the rationale to conduct May 1998 explosions including :-
a. Hindutva Factor. The Hindu populace including its leaders have never forgotten its glorious past and the enormous kingdom. It was the appeal for the revival of this lost identity that the raise of Baharati Janta Party to power was made possible. In short the nuclearisation of Mother India has always stayed close to the hearts of the Hindu extremists.
b. Geo-Strategic Environments and China Factor. Former Indian Prime Minister I. K. Gujral linked the overt testing by India with the prevailing situation in South Asia at that time which included the storage of nuclear weapons in Diego Garcia and the neighbourhood of nuclear armed China. On the contrary, the Indian scholars and analysts opine that the situation was relatively stable at that time including the relations with China. Thus it was primarily the lust of power projection by India which led to the nuclear tests.
c. Quest for the Great Power Status. Quests fro the regional dominance and the global prominence have been the hallmark of Indian strategy since her inception. Indian political aspirations have been recorded by Brigadier Javed Hassan in these words’ “ to ensure security in the sub-continent; to limit and eventually eliminate the role and influence of outside powers in South Asia; maximise India’s self reliance and independence in the international arena and the aspiration to an eventual great power status. The draft nuclear doctrine announced on 17 August 1999 by the BJP government was also an indication of their hegemonic designs.
d. Permanent Membership of Security Council. India in the recent past duly backed by Russia has always dreamed form part of the permanent members of the Security Council. It had been a strong candidate for this status and has been involved in an extensive lobbying for this. Hence, the overt neuclearisation was regarded by Indian decision makers as a pre-condition to acquire a permanent membership at the UN Security Council, a long time dream and the highway to global status.
MILITARY AMBITIONS
17. India has invested $ 400 – 500 million a year on military research annually for almost a decade. This puts her in league with countries like Italy, Sweden and Spain. Together with the nuclear and space research, the total comes to over $ one billion each year. These three areas make a total of 60 percent of the country’s science budget, at the expense of social and development research[6]. Similarly, India is maintaining large standing armed forces which are divergent to the actual threat being faced by the country.
18. Defence Spending. India’s total defence budget for the year 2001 -2002 has been hiked by Rupees 7539 Lakhs from the previous year to Rupees 62,000 Lakhs. It was an increase by 13.8 percent indicating the Government’s resolve to push ahead with the ongoing modernisation drive in the armed forces. Around a third is allocated on the equipment programmes. This comes to 2.6 percent of Gross Domestic Product. Details as per armed forces as appended below :-
a. Army – Rupees 37,498 Lakhs i.e. 60.4% of total fund.
b. Navy – Rupees 9138 i.e. 14.7 %.
c. Air force – Rupees 15172 i.e. 24.47 %.
19. Modernisation Projects
a. Army. General Padmanabhan has initiated a 20-year plan to modernise the army’s equipment to reflect changing operational needs and revolution in military affairs. He dismissed the reduction of his 1.1 million army on account of their responsibility to man 140 kilometres of line of control. The salient aspects include :-
(1) He intended to induct 310 Russian T-90 MBTs in the army within a span of 30 years.(2) The army’s inventory of towed and Self-Propelled Artillery will be standardised to 155 mm within next 35-40 years.
(3) At the same time enhancing the infantry’s capability by providing night vision equipment, better anti tank weapons and combat body armour.
(4) Induction of Agni II nuclear armed intermediate range missile in the army.
(5) Nuclear Biological and Chemical protection for the ground forces to include up gradation of current Main Battle Tanks and Armoured Personnel Carriers, acquisition of pre-fabricated shelters and building of an efficient C4I system.
(6) Improvement in air defence system.
b. Navy. India’s main strategic challenge is the rapidly growing Chinese Navy and to increase its area of influence beyond the Malaccan and Singapore straits as a part of its power projection. Its navy is projecting itself as a stabilising force in the Indian Ocean region through increased maritime diplomacy and joint manoeuvres with the foreign navies. It is also trying to maintain a robust presence in the region by introducing new weaponry and other force multipliers in her arsenal. Some of these efforts include :-
(1) Negotiations with Russia t op grade its eight Tupolev maritime reconnacessance aircraft by equipping them with anti-ship missiles, advance navigation aids and electronic warfare equipment.
(2) Successful test fire of naval version of short range surface to surface missile Prithivi named Dhanush. It is likely to be inducted in Indian navy in the near future.
(3) Induction of modern C4I system.
(4) Plans for the induction of French Scorpene submarines, a better version than Pakistan’s Agosta class submarinesc.
Airforce. At the biannual Air Force Commanders conference in April 2001, the Air Force Chief, Air Chief Marshal A.Y.Tipnis projected the need for more combat fighter squadrons in order to maintain an effective deterrence. The IAF Vision 2020 document envisages at least 10 squadrons of Su-30s and up gradation of existing infrastructure. They have also plans for the induction of Airborne Early Warning and Control systems aircrafts; air-to-air refuellers unmanned air vehicles, low level radars and an integrated communication system.
ECONOMIC APRIRATIONS
20. According to the World Development indicators released by the World Bank in 2000, India is now the forth largest economy in the world with a purchasing power parity amounting to $ 2 trillion. Since 1991, the policy of liberalisation has meant a gradual but definite trend towards integrating India into the global economy. The inflation rate has been reduced along with the fiscal deficit. The economic reforms in 1990s encouraged the private and the forging investment. Except for 15 sectors most of the industries have been delicensed. Moreover, India is the World Bank’s biggest borrower with half of the borrowing done on commercial terms. Similarly, India retuned a handsome amount of $ 4.5 billion which was borrowed from IMF in 1991.[7]
21. Stock Exchanges. India is the third largest investor base after USA and Japan with around 20 million investors. India credit rating was downgraded in 1998 by International Credit Rating Agencies in 1998. However, by July 1991 it gained 10.8 percent in dollar terms to attain the position of sixth most performing stock markets in the world. During the reforms of 1990s, following stock exchanges were established :-
a. National Stock Exchange.
b. Over-the-Counter Exchange of India.
c. Inter-connected Stock Exchange of India Limited, Mumbai. It is promoted by 15 regional stock exchanges.
22. Foreign Investments. According to A.T. Ranking conducted by 1000 Chief Executive Officers from the world largest firms in mid1999, India is the world’s sixth best investment destination after USA, China, UK, Brazil and Mexico. India has signed bilateral Investment Protection Agreement with 28 countries with a few more to be signed in the near future. Some of the major investment sources[8] and trade partners are :-
23. Trade. In 1998-99, Indian exports amounted to Rupees 1416 billion, while imports were valued at Rupees 344.9 billion. The trade deficit increased by 26 percent in first quarter of 2000-01, despite a 27.65 percent increase in the exports. West Europe is the major trading partner accounting to 28 percent of Indian exports and 32 percent of imports. Export of computer software is also increasing rapidly.
CHAPTER III – IMPLICATIONS
24. Implications for Regiona. With the increase in nuclear weapon states, the number of nuclear assisting states, i.e. providing uranium, small reactor. Etc, would also increase. That would make the I.A.E.A safeguards not only ineffective but also impractical, since most of Indian nuclear reactors are safeguard free.
b. Nuclear weapons capability would place India in a better bargaining position vis-à-vis China.
c. Other smaller states will look towards a nuclear weapons programme, or seeking a nuclear umbrella from either of the nuclear powers. Even the smaller countries of the region like Bangladesh and Sri Lanka, apart from Pakistan, may do so for their own national security.
d. The poverty in the region would increase because of developing nuclear weapons at the cost of national and regional hunger and poverty.
e. The threat of nuclear war would further increase in the South Asian region 25. Implications for Pakistan. Pakistan is the key country in any arrangement for maintaining stability in the region and as a counter weight to India. In order to achieve this balance of power and its security compulsions, Pakistan decided to follow the Indian suit. Some of the implications Indian nuclear programme on Pakistan are :-
a. Both India and Pakistan have plunged themselves into a race which adds to the hunger everyday. In a pursuit to achieve external security, India stands today on the verge of disintegration. A poverty stricken society is more vulnerable to any catastrophe. 40% of Indian population is hardly maintaining itself below poverty line. Her debt burden stands at 80 billion US $. In contrast to the two very important facets of national outlook, the education and health, expenditure on defence is seriously high as far as Pakistan is concerned. Pakistan with $28 billion deficit stands at dangerously higher slot with regards to the defence expenditure.
b. This development may encourage persistent mistrust, regional rivalry, lingering disputes and irreconcilable differences between India and Pakistan.
c. Although the chances of an all out war has been minimised, however, the chances of limited wars can not be denied. Similarly, various facets of low intensity conflicts will now emerge more frequently to aiming at destabilising each other without being involved openly.
d. The capability will enable India to over- whelmingly dominate the Indian Ocean as well as the Arabian Sea through her strong Navy which will adversely affect Pakistan’s trade through waters because of the weak Navy.
e. New arm race between India and Pakistan will start which would not only lead to the development of a multi-power region but also force Pakistan to take all measures to ensure its security by developing the military might and nuclear/missile programmes.
f. The foreign investment coming to the country will be effected because of the instability in the region.
g. Poverty within the country will increase affecting life of general public badly in all spheres of life.
CONCLUSION
26. Based on the above discussion, it can be concluded that there is no doubt that India’s desire for a global image and a world power role is as intense today as it was in the times of Indra Gandhi. India developed her nuclear programme in consonance with the idea to be a major player in the world politics which was conceived soon after her inception. There are some analysts who believe that the distance between India’s desire and the goal is not getting any shorter and India is destined to remain an under-achiever. But there is another circle who strongly profess that India is capable of turning her vision into reality because of its growing economy in size, mass and sophistication and its ever expanding military and political influence in the Indian Ocean Region. It has surely employed the nuclear factor to increase her area of influence and to gain a global power status looking beyond Pakistan. Pakistan on the other hand needs to be watchful on any developments in India owing to her security compulsions. There is a definite need for Pakistan to pay requisite attention on her economy and create favourable situation in the country to invite foreign investments by maintaining the law and order situation in the country. This will not only ensure to redress our security compulsions but will also ensure that this will not be at the cost of the people of Pakistan.
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[1] Shamsa Nawaz,”Indian Nuclear Programme “.Lahore : Progressive , 1985.page 7.[2] George Perkovich,”India’s Nuclear Bomb” London : University of California ,1999. Page 161[3] ibid, page 496[4] Ashok Kapur,” India’s Nuclear Option. Prager : 1976. , page 55[5] Lieutenant Colonel M.Fayyaz, “India’s nuclear ambition”- citadel 1/2001, page 25[6] Lieutenant General R>K> Jasbir Singh, “Indian Defence 2002”, Nartaj : 2001.Page 330[7] Mohan M. Mathews , “India Facts and Figures “ , Sterling 2001.Page 198.
[8] Ibid , page 212.
[9] George Pervkovick, “ India’s Nuclear Bomb”, Page 444[10] F. Ali, “Agni – A Threat to the US Navy in the Indian Ocean” The Nation, 30 May 1904. [11] Greg Gerardi “India’s 333 rd Prithvi Missile Group”, Jane’s Intelligence Review P-364. [12] Centre of international studies, “The India Pakistan Military Balance”