POWER POLITICS IN INDIAN OCCEAN
Whoever controls the Indian Ocean dominates Asia. This Ocean is the key to the Seven seas. In the 21 st century the destiny of the world will be decided on its water.
Alferd Mahan, cited in Guido Gersa, “Will the Indian Ocean become a Soviet Pond?”[1]
INTRODUCTIONGeographic Position And Importance. 1. The Indian Ocean is the third largest body of water in the world, covering about 20% of the Earth’s water surface. It is bounded on the north by southern Asia; on the west by the Arabian Peninsula and Africa; on the east by the Malay Peninsula, the Sunda Islands, and Australia; and on the south by Antarctica. The ocean is nearly 10,000 km (6,200 mi) wide at the southern tips of Africa and Australia; its area is 73,556,000 sq km (28,400,000 sq mi), including the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf. The ocean’s volume is estimated to be 292,131,000 km(3) (70,086,000 mi(3)). Small islands dot the continental rims. Island nations within the ocean are Madagascar (formerly Malagasy Republic), the world’s fourth largest island; Comoros; Seychelles; Maldives; Mauritius; and Sri Lanka. 2. In 1611 the Dutch were the first to discover that ships could successfully sail the India Ocean without dependence upon the periodic Monsoon winds, and hence sea route between Africa and East Indies could be exploited through out the year. Since than the ocean’s importance as a transit route between Asia, Africa and Europe has made it a scene of conflict. Because of its size, however, no one nation had successfully dominated until the early 1800s when Britain controlled much of the surrounding land and strategically important chock point’s .The dominance of Britain was so pronounced that it was referred as British Lake.3. British influence and position eroded considerably during World War II. The independence of Sub-Continent – the key stone of defence in the region – called for total reappraisal of British position east of Suez. As was realized in 1908 by Lord Cruzan,” when India has gone and the great Colonies have gone, do you suppose that we can stop here? Your ports and coaling stations, your fortresses and dockyards, your colonies and protectorates will go too. For either they will be unnecessary as the toll – gates and barbicans of an empire that has vanished or they will be taken by the enemy more powerful than yourselves.” The speed and the extent of the proposed withdrawal were viewed through out the world as too large and hasty. The projected power vacuum in the region was considered the loss of area by default to an imminent Soviet dominance. This apprehension gave rise to super power rivalry in Indian Ocean and US started to develop its influence in the area. As was expressed by Anthony Harrigon,” The focus of military confrontation by the mid -1970’s is likely to be the Indian Ocean world. Thus if US interest are to be protracted, it is essential that American defence planning be geared up to the specific challenges likely to emerged in the Indian Ocean area.”[2] The end of the Cold War did not alter the fact stated by Anthony Harrigon. The United States remains a maritime nation with global security concerns and felt obliged to maintain the capacity to project and sustain its forces throughout the world and especially Indian Ocean in defence of its own interests and those of its allies.
4. Aim. The aim of this paper is to identify and analyse the dominating influence in Indian Ocean enjoyed by USA in post Gulf war era and its effects on international community’s security and economic interest, also to study the response of world economic power; littoral state’s perspective on emerging trends in the region.
AMERICAN INTEREST AND STRATEGY IN THE REGIONEconomic Interest6. Economic interest plays a major role in shaping US foreign policies and projecting American power and influence abroad. US economic interests in the region are centred on the key resources, like oil, critical materials and minerals and the sea line of communication. Admiral Zumwalt while giving briefing to congress and senate committee on foreign relation elaborated this point and said that “Indian Ocean region has become a focal point of US foreign and economic polices and has growing impact on our Security.” Comparatively lesser cost of the foreign resources, the increasing use of alloy-supporting mineral and the consumer orientation of its economy have increased the dependency on resources from abroad. The United State, as Table 1 shows, has to depend on external sources of supply for as many as 18 critical materials and minerals. Many of these materials come from the Indian Ocean area, making Washington vulnerable to adverse development in the region. Some US strategists favour an augmented Indian Ocean presence primarily to ensure continued access to these strategic resources, especially oil. Thus economic consideration transforms the US quest for a strategy in the Indian Ocean from a purely military matter into a broad policy concern.6. The broad policy concern of US strategy planners were not confined to the interest of Washington but also encompassed the economic concerns of its impotent Westerns allies, Australia, New Zealand and Japan. For the economic survival of these allies the un-impeded transportation of raw material, oil and finished products through the Sea Lane of Communication (SLOCs) was mandatory. President Nixon in his annual report on foreign policy to congress in May 1973 stated ,” as US and other industrial nations energy demands rose , the need of Persian Gulf oil would increase, therefore; assurance of the continuing flow of Middle East energy resource is increasingly important to the US, Western Europe and Japan.”[1] In ever developing world of today the importance of continued supply of oil to the US and its allies have become the corner stone of American foreign and defence policies. US Strategy (A Historical Background).5. In the post WW II international scene the main concern of United State was to contain the expansion of communism in Europe. The Indian Ocean area did not become the major threat after the cold war, although there was a semblance of the East-West struggle .France and England still had extensive colonial possessions in the area and their presence especially that of Britain provided a sense of security for the United States. The Korean War had a profound effect on the US defence strategy concerns, which were extended to include a great part of the Asia. Consequently the alliances with the littoral countries were established. Washington entreated the South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), in 1954 to check the south–west expansion of the Chinese, which was considered to be an allied of USSR. Washington also created ANZUS (Australia, New Zealand, and the United States) to ensure protection of two European nations. Additionally, US encouraged the formation of Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), where it participated as an observer. In all these arrangements, Washington sought, and secured major participation of London, and kept her presence in area limited to flag -showing profile at Bahrain- based Mideastforce. 6. The Suez crises and near end of Colonial rule brought home the fact that the British can not continue its presence in the region indefinitely, nonetheless the announcement of British withdrawal came as surprise. The impressive Soviet entry into the region (March 1968) in the wake of the British decision to withdraw from the area was seen as a part of a calculated Russian move to fill the vacuum created by the withdrawal. These historic events led US to believe that in an area as important as the India Ocean, It is dangerous to let the Soviet Union acquire a capability that would be substantially greater than its own. Thus, to the US, its presence in the Afro-Asian Ocean becomes a matter of new urgency.The Nixon Doctrine 7. In the post – Vietnam doctrine the reemphasis on the navy was also due to the outcome of the Vietnam experience. It convinced the US planner to fight the potential adversaries in the Asian region on the sea and in the air, where they are visibly weaker. The seaward move in this region was also influenced by the political and diplomatic consequences of getting entangled in local disputes. A carrier based on the high sea was considered to be the best option for influencing the regional and international policies of the littoral countries.8. Under the Nixon doctrine, the security arrangements of the Indian Ocean were modified to provide a more balanced Washington role, in the shape of increased sharing of the burden and responsibilities by the allies for their own protection and proportionate sharing of material and manpower cost of security. American involvement in the area would continue in the lesser scale .This doctrine emphasised that, in some cases and area US would be militarily involved and in some cases involvement would be much lesser. [2]9. The Nixon doctrine, in spite of its apparent objectives, did not try to reduce US leadership role. The key was a balanced role that would continue to represent US interest in the area but also encourage the littoral countries to contribute towards their security. While the US would provide the air and naval presence as a possible deterrence, the allied would supply their own ground troops. With their flexibility, mobility and relative independence from their location in the international waters, the naval units seem to be uniquely suitable for the viable presence that the US desired to provide in the area. To maintain the necessary deterrence, it was necessary that any part of the Indian Ocean should be reached within the shortest possible time and without any interference of the littoral states. In the context of the Nixon doctrine’s of “island strategy” Diego Garcia constitute a pivot of American naval power in the India Ocean. Where by, the SOLC entering from the Atlantic Ocean, Meditarian Sea and Persian Gulf were secured through the Diego Garcia atoll and the approaches to the east of Indian Ocean were secure through the alliance with Australia and Japan. 10. In post Gulf war era the US continued to maintain the alliances and facilities developed through the Nixon Doctrine. However, the post 9/11 events have increased the involvement of the US Administration. In light of post 9/11 scenario, the Union speech by President Bush, underlines two overriding strategic concern which contributes towards American’s policy towards Asia in general and Indian Ocean in particular, oil and war against “China”.[3]The most important factor for extensive US involvement can be understood by excerpt of the article written by Phil Gasper,” Washington says that it has justice on its side in its war in Afghanistan. But just as in the Gulf War, oil is the underlying motivation for U.S. intervention. George W. Bush says that the defeated Taliban was “the most repressive regime in the history of the world.” But this was the very government that Washington helped to bring to power. According to journalist Ahmed Rashid, “The United States encouraged Saudi Arabia and Pakistan to support the Taliban, certainly right up to their advance on Kabul [in 1996].”When the Taliban took power, State Department spokesperson Glyn Davies said that he saw “nothing objectionable” in the Taliban’s plans to impose strict Islamic (or Sharia) law. “The Taliban will probably develop like the Saudis,” said another U.S. diplomat. “There will be Aramco [an oil consortium], pipelines, an emir, no parliament and lots of Sharia law. We can live with that. “The reference to oil and pipelines is the key to understanding U.S. actions. Since the collapse of the USSR at the end of 1991, U.S. oil companies and their friends in the State Department have been salivating at the prospect of gaining access to the huge oil and natural gas reserves in the former USSR republics in Central Asia that border the Caspian Sea. The reserves are worth an estimated $4 trillion–making Central Asia “the Middle East of the 21st century,” in the words of Middle East Economic Digest.[4] China’s Projected Naval Strategy And Its Implication.11. With the normalization of relations with the United States and lessening of the Soviet threat, Beijing leaders currently perceive minimal threat of a major war on the mainland. Under leaders like Admiral Liu Huaqing the commander of the PLA-N from 1982 to 1988, the PLA-N has begun transforming from a brown water coastal defense force to a blue water ocean-going fleet that can increasingly project power and engage adversaries farther from the mainland. His vision was essentially consistent with Mahan’s idea that a nation cannot be a great power without sea power. Liu advocated an offshore defense strategy to replace coastal defense. He explained that since the threat of foreign land invasion from the sea was insignificant, the navy should focus on extending its defensive perimeter to safeguard Chinese maritime interests. The admiral defined this defensive perimeter as the first island chain (diyi daolian) bounded by the Japanese home islands, the Ryukyu Islands, Taiwan, the Philippines, Borneo and the Indonesian islands of Natuna Besar. Essentially, maritime defense was to be extended from brown waters to blue waters in a 200-400 nautical mile range, and further in the case of disputed territories in the South China Sea. According to John Lewis and Xue Litai, modern long-range threats such as sea-launched cruise missiles in the inventories of the U.S. and other nations have also influenced this extension. PLA-N leaders even began considering a larger perimeter enclosed by a second island chain (di er daolian), formed by the Marianas, Guam and the Carolines. China did not yet have the technological capabilities or economic means to shift from coastal defense to a truly blue water fleet, but it was beginning to think in terms of Mahanian sea power. China’s grand strategy in the South China Sea is primarily a matter of economic resources. Much of the current literature on the PLA-N discusses its presence in this region because of recent territorial disputes over the Spratlys islands chain (Map No 3). Most of the navy’s actual combat experience in recent years has been in the South China Sea. Naval leaders have specifically cited this experience to justify the switch to a blue water navy.[5]China and Myanmar Relations.12. China’s inability to impede the eastward incursion of US Indian Ocean and Mediterranean fleet before the Malacca Strait, seriously undermine her ability to exercise her influence in the South China Sea. The strained relation of Myanmar with the West provided an opportunity to establish a foot hold west of South China Sea and monitor and if required interdict the non-regional power before they challenge the PLA-N in South China Sea. Concurrently, it would allow her to extend her influence beyond the South China Sea. With this foreseeable aim, China started upgrading its radar and naval auxiliary facilities at the Coco Islands and assisting Myanmar in constructing a naval base in Sittwe, a strategically important Myanmar sea port close to India’s largest city, Kolkatta. She is also helping in upgrading Myanmar’s naval facilities and in setting up four electronic listening posts along the Bay of Bengal and Andaman Sea. One of these is very close to Indian defense facilities. Chinese have built an all-weather road from Kunming in southern China to Mandalay in central Myanmar.[6]13. These developments, when seen in the broader perspective, allow China to access Indian Ocean and still steer clear of the chock points, which connects Indian Ocean with South China Sea. Hence avoiding the influence exercised by the US and its allies at strategic straits west of South China Sea, it would also allow her to monitor and if required interdict or delay the induction of Naval forces from Indian Ocean or Atlantic Ocean.10. Implications on Regional Balance of Power. The current direction of PLA-N development and offshore defense strategy match the long-term strategic threats to China, which will continue to motivate China to seek blue water strategic sea power status. The economic gains for China in the South China Sea would adversely affect the economic interest of other littoral states, especially in the Spratlys Islands. Secondly, the domination in South China Sea and control of Spratlys Island gives a strategic advantage of controlling or at least influencing the sea lane traffic emanating from or to Indian Ocean. These routes are economic life lines by which the economies of Northeast Asia receive critical inputs like oil and other critical resources and export finished goods to the rest of the world. Also, because of the relative lack of land-based transport, much interregional trade also depends on the waterways. From a military perspective, these sea- lanes are critical to the movement of US forces from the Western pacific to the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf. Furthermore, almost all shipping must pass through one of three straits, or “choke points”, in the region, namely the Strait of Mallacca, Sunda Strait, and Strait of Lombok and Makassar (Map No 3 ). An attempt by China to adopt a position from where it could control or interdict these sea-lanes would invite the counter move by US and its allies to deny the same. Therefore, Chinese design of modernising its navy and its area of operations is bound to generate counter moves by the regional and non-regional power, which would aim at denying this position of advantage to China. The land route between Myanmar and China allow China to extent her influence beyond South China Sea, in strategically important region of Bay of Bengal and Andaman Nicobar Islands. This disposition would adversely affect the Indian Government desire to exert influence on relatively weak maritime littoral states of Bay of Bengal and Andaman Sea.[7] INDIAN DESIGNS AND ITS IMPLICATION11. The Indian desire to influence the geopolitics of littorals and the Indian Ocean itself is embedded in her economics development and prevalent political environment. Till late seventies the Indian have been pursuing the policy of Zone of Peace in Indian Ocean. The broad parameters of this policy were in consonance with the policy followed by their strategic partner Soviet Union. The Indian and Russian through this policy wanted to reduce the influence of American. Which, they were not able to counter militarily. As described by K. Subrahmanyam,” All arms control measures adopted to date evoke a degrees of cynicism. In all the cases the countries agreed not to do something that, in any case, they were not thinking to do at this stage. Against this background, it is clear that the goal of Indian Ocean Zone of Peace, often ridiculed as visionary, deserve to be taken no less seriously than other arms control proposal.”[8] It is from this point of compromise that the economic prosperity and development have allowed Indians to elevate themselves to a place where they expect to be treated at par with the only super power of the new world order.12. Before proceeding further, it will be in order to compare Indian Navy with other actors of the Indian Ocean, Table 1 & 2 show the relative comparison of regional and non regional maritime powers, operating in Indian Ocean. It is evident from the table that the Indian Naval strength does not put her into a frame where it can effectively dominate or even influence the politics of high seas; however, she can exert limited pressure on littorals states. Whereas, the Indian doctrine envisaged adopting the legacy of British Royal Navy, as stated by Defense Minister George Fernandes at the launching of India’s latest warship,” India’s area of interest extends from the north of the Arabian Sea to the South China Sea”.[9] However, as discussed above, the India Navy (IN) does not have the means to translate it into reality, mainly because of presence of superior naval American armada at Indian Sea. 13. Under the prevalent political environment, where US sees China as the strategic rival rather than strategic partner, the Republican administration have encouraged India to evolve common strategic objectives in the Indian Ocean area, despite apprehension of Washington that “Delhi’s strategic vision remains hostage to the rivalry with Pakistan. India has not shown; US it really can think outside the (subcontinent) box”.[10] They have planned to hold the Malabar series of naval exercises in the Indian Ocean or the Arabian Sea in October, where for the first time a Cruiser Destroyer Group of three or four ships and maritime reconnaissance aircraft will participate. [11] On the other hand the India is actively involved in extending her influence in South East Indian Ocean, where her vessels carried out joint exercise with Vietnam and South Korea.[12]14. In consonance with American design of operations in Indian Ocean, the Indian naval strategist, for the time being, have modified their objectives and have accepted American hegemony in the Afro Asian Ocean. By doing so they have ensured that in west sea board Indian Navy is actively involved with US in safe guarding the SLOCs emanating from the Gulf and Red Sea, and on eastern seaboard they sought the littoral of South China Sea and south east Indian Ocean to cooperate in keeping the Malacca strait safe and to contain the Chinese increasing influence in the South China Sea.IRAN AND PERSIAN GULF STATES,INCLUCDING SAUDI ARABIA ROLE IN INDIAN OCEAN POLITICSPersian Gulf States And Saudi Arabia.
15. The economic interest of America, its allies and the countries of the gulf region converges on ensuring unimpeded transportation of hydrocarbon riches of the region to the rest of the world. Disruption of the American interest in early seventies led US to bring radical changes in her policies in the region. By late seventies US responded by creating Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF).Base agreement were signed with several countries, including Oman. During the Regan Administration the status of the RDJTF was raised to US Central Command (CENTCOM), with regional headquarters located at Bahrain.
16. The US in order to protect her interest wanted to tie various Gulf States militarily under USCENTCOM. The GCC States were however divided over military cooperation with the super powers. While Oman preferred a collective defence agreement between the Gulf countries and the US, Kuwait wanted a balance relationship with both the superpowers and Saudis wanted to reserve the right of defining the parameters of cooperation with the USA. According to the Secretary General of the GCC Abdullha Bishra, “The member states did not want either superpower to gain the foothold in the Gulf area and preferred a “Gulfanisation” of Gulf security that is an arrangement based upon cooperation among the Gulf States on matter of internal security and external threat”.[13]
17. The Post- Gulf War scenario had a tremendous impact on the region, the Clinton Administration policy of dual containment, excluded both the Iran and Iraq from security arrangements of Gulf region. There was general erosion of the GCC ruler’s faith in mutual reliance and an exclusively Arab security alliance. The GCC states started having bilateral defence pact with USA and western states.[14] Under present circumstances, where the unpredictable Saddam and Iran are continuously trying to dominate the region, GCC states will rely on USA as a counter balance force and the situation is likely to continue for near future.
Iran
18. Iran’s geographic location, her size, population and oil resources underlines her potentials to play her right full role in structuring security arrangements in the region, especially in Persian Gulf. Realizing her potential, Nixon doctrine encouraged Iran along with Saudi Arabia to take leading role in security of gulf region.[15]Consequently, the Royal Iranian Navy was the most sophisticated in the entire Indian Ocean area. After the Islamic revolution and fighting Iraq between 1980 and 1988 decimated the country’s capabilities to influence the regional politics. Moreover, US will not allow Iran to interfere in matters of gulf and /or access to the gulf’s energy supplies, as recently reiterated by Secretary of State Colin Powel “We will not yield our strategic position in Asia”.[16]With Iranian interest on divergent course to US, the revival of Iranian influence, as was dreamed by the Shah of Iran, may not materialise in near future. At the same time to safe guard her maritime and economic interest, some analysts argue “There is certainly an attempt to increase the capabilities of the Iranian military, although the full extent of it is not clear.[17] Shahram Chubin believes, “Iranian strategy is to hold the Arab states hostage: “if we get hit by the Americans then you (Arab) will get hit by us. It’s a sort of logical asymmetrical strategy, as it doesn’t make sense to confront the Americans head on.”[18] Chubin, while continuing his arguments agrees that much of Iran’s equipment in the Gulf is aimed at making life as difficult as possible for outside powers. “Mines, submarines, missiles and fast attack boats could be called ‘sea denial’ capabilities to deny the Americans complete control in the Gulf,” he said, “The Americans and others, of course, insist on seeing these as ‘sea control’ weapons, part of an effort to impose Iranian hegemony on their neighbours.” [19]The forgoing arguments suggest that until the US-Iranian relations normalise the Iran will continue to contest the American influence in the Gulf and in broader percept in the Indian Ocean itself.”THE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE TO US STRATEGY19. The international response to the US influence in the Indian Ocean can be two groups first group comprises of USA allies like NATO, ANZUS and Japan. The second group could be made of those countries, which are against the unilateral hegemonic American policies in the region. The response of China, India and Iran had been discussed in the preceding paragraphs. In subsequent paragraphs the response of USA allied and Russia will be discussed.Western Europe and Japan20. The Western Europe and Japan are strategically dependent on oil from the Middle East. Therefore, the SLOCs passing through the Indian Ocean features as one of the most important strategic concern of these countries. The total collapse of Soviet Union resulted in the US attaining the apex position in the uni-polar world, with the ability to safeguard her and her allies’ economic interest. Therefore it is unlikely that the Western allies and Japan will oppose US hegemony in the Indian Ocean region.21. Another aspect of unipolar world order is the resurgence of regional conflicts, which could influence the economic and maritime interests of western allies and Japan. Regional concerns over the threat posed by the Iraq and Iran and the ongoing Israel- Palestine conflict again force the allies to continue supporting the US military hegemony in the region, although present Bush Administration has alienated the allies, by taking unilateral decisions on matters relating to the region. However, the memory of Iran’s defection from the western fold and the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq are too strong for the allies to out rightly oppose US policy in the region. It is therefore, unlikely that Western allies and Japan will alienate the US in matters relating to Indian Ocean.Russia 22. In the aftermath of Soviet Union disintegration, the situation has redefined the contours of post-Cold War regional alignments in the region. During the Cold War era, the Indian Ocean region remained relatively peaceful with super powers presence, maintaining the geo-strategic equilibrium, and created a regional balance, which largely preserve the regional peace. The power vacuum that followed resulted in establishing US hegemony in the region.23. Russia’s inability to impede the expansion of US influence has forced her to revive her bilateral ties with the lesser powers like India, Iran and China. During the visit of Russian President Vladimir Putin to Indian on October 2000, both the countries pledged to work together for the establishment of a multipolar world based on sovereign equality of all states. The two sides expressed their determined opposition to the unilateral use or threat of use of force in violation of UN charter.[20] On the other hand Russia and China argue “they have no choice but to draw closer and turn other countries into our alliance, to counterbalance US dominance.” Says senior Russian diplomat Yuli Vorontosv.[21]24. On military front a new naval doctrine is being formulated, which aims at reviving the Russian Navy back to mighty maritime power status. After ratification of START-2 treaty, many expert saw the nuclear deterrent role as shifting to the new generation of nuclear submarines equipped with intercontinental ballistic missiles. Admiral Vladimir Kuroyedov wants this idea the foundation of Russia’s naval doctrine.[22]Speaking about future plans for the Navy he said, “An aging fleet is one of our biggest problem, our task for 2001 and beyond is to restore reliable technical preparedness in the Navy and improve sailor professionalism. I believe that this new century will see us leaving the docks and heading for the oceans. We planned for our ships to be on two month military duty in the Indian Ocean.”[23] 25. Till the revival of Russian Navy, the Russia will continue to make her presence felt by bilateral ties and military assistance to regional states like India and Iran, and opposition the unilateral use or threat of use of force in violation of UN charter.POLICY OPTIONS FOR PAKISTANDeterminant of Policy Option26. The determinants of policy option for a government are many. Of these the only permanent element is geography. The other factors are variable and liable to change. Therefore, policy options have to be responsive to these changes. The events of the last decade demonstrate how complete and radical these changes can be. The first and most obvious, new structural reality is the disappearance of US-Soviet competition. Neither Pakistan nor India can now expect the assistance of one or the other super-power as they could have in the Cold War years. With the demise of the Soviet Union, the United States does not have the incentive to provide assistance to Pakistan. By the same token India has lost its most important Soviet diplomatic, political support which was crucial both for supporting Indian efforts at increasing its military influence in the Indian Ocean region. [24] CONCLUSION31. From this over view, we can discern that American military build up in the region are reflective of her desire to dominate the region, mainly for economical gain and to subdue Chinese growing influence. Incidentally, the alternatives to depleting oil reserve of Gulf region are found in the CARs. The economical and strategically safe passage to these reserves is only through Pakistan. To draw maximum benefit from this situation development of Gawader port is mandatory. The fraternisation with America, especially in Makran Coastal area, may alienate China. Therefore, there is a need to restrict American access to purely commercial bases.32. The closer ties between USA and India and Indian Navy expansion programme may, during the hostility period, deny the free use of sea lane. This situation demands augmenting the Pakistani Naval capability to a level where it may have minimum offensive and defensive deterrence to deny Indian Navy the unchallenged access to Arabian Sea, and EEZ.
[1] Persian Gulf : Energy Security Concern ; an article by Syed Murtaza Moosvi Director General Research and Development FRIENDS Iran.
[2] Richard Nixon, US Foreign policy for the 1970, report to the Congress, 3May 1973.
[3] WSWS.Org, State of the Union speech: Bush declares war on the world, By the Editorial Board31 January 2002
[4] PHIL GASPER, The story of the world’s most valuable commodity, The politics of oil, January 25, 2002 | Pages 6 and 7
[5] Garver, John W. ¡°China¡¯s Push Through the South China Sea: The Interaction of Bureaucratic and National Interests,¡± The China Quarterly, No. 132, Dec. 1992.
[6] Asia Times Special Reports Feb 2001 “Myanmar shows India the road to Southeast Asia “By Tony Allison
[7] Whiting, Allen S. “The PLA and China’s Threat Perceptions, The China Quarterly, No. 146, June 1996
[8] Superpower Rivalry in the Indian Ocean Selig S Harrison p223
[9] Asia Times On Line April2001
[10] US strategy for Peace Stanly Foundation 42 conference report oct 2001
[11] Article By Sridhar Krishnaswami, The Hindu May 11 2002
[12] Let India help, By Richard Fisher, Washington Times – May 18, 2000
[13] Asdhraf Hussan,Iran-GCC relations in AK Pasha, India, Iran and the GCC Stages: Political Strategy and Foreign Policy, (NewDehli: mans Publications,2000),p171
[14] US Naval Policy in the Indian Ocean, Rahul Roy-Chaudhury,Research Fellow,IDSA
[15] Chapter 4,Us security in the ndian Ocean
[16] US challenges and choices in the Gulf, Policy Brief, Stanley Foundation
[17] Iran Gulf Inter net
[18] Darius Bazargan, a London-based journalist, has written for the Middle East Economic Digest, “Meedmoney,” “The Middle East,”
[19] ibd
[20] Russia, China, India: A New Strategic Triangle for a New Cold War? Julie M. Rahm From Parameters, Winter 2001-02, pp. 87-97.
[21] Jamie Dettmer, “Russian-Chinese Alliance Emerges,” Insight, 3-10 April 2000, p. 20
[22] Russia look to regain its maritime glory, The Russia Journal 13 – 19 Jan2001, by Valdimir Mukhin
[23] ibd
[24]CURRENT AFFAIRS The Dimension of Foreign Policy By Anees ur Rehman
